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These are not good times for those who care about truth in politics. 
False postings about political candidates inundate the Internet.1 
Foreign governments actively spread false information in order to 
influence elections.2 Political actors are increasingly brazen in 
advancing false and deceptive assertions.3 Even robots have gotten 
into the act, having become major tools for the spread of false political 
information.4 Meanwhile, parts  of the electorate itself does not seem 
to care,5 seemingly preferring deliberate lies over objective truth when 
misinformation reinforces their pre-existing prejudices.6 
 
Much of this (robots aside) is not new. People have lied in political 
campaigns for as long as there have been political campaigns.7 But 
there is no question that the severity and impact of false campaign 





1 Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1519, 1528-29 (2019). 
2 Id. at 1528. 
3 Drew Harwell, Doctored Images Have Become a Fact of Life for Political 
Campaigns. When They’re Disproved, Believers ‘Just Don’t Care,’ WASH. POST 
(Jan. 14, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/14/doctored-political-images/ 
[https://perma.cc/297T-2RJB]. 
4 Nunziato, supra note 1, at 1528. 
5 Harwell, supra note 3. 
6 See Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
POL’Y 57, 68-69 (2017) (noting that the public has trouble recognizing false political 
information online and stating that this confusion “exacerbates the natural human 
tendency toward confirmation bias”). 
7 Elaine Kamarck, A Short History of Campaign Dirty Tricks Before Twitter and 
Facebook, BROOKINGS (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/07/11/a-short-history-of-campaign-
dirty-tricks-before-twitter-and-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/AH5N-CX5P]. 
8 Nunziato, supra note 1, at 1528-29 (stating that today’s “online marketplace of 
ideas is fraught with unique problems,” including echo chambers, election 
interference from foreign actors, automated bots and trolls, and the wide reach of 
“fake election news stories”).  
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documented, false information spreads across online platforms with 
disturbing speed,9 often outpacing the spread of truthful information.10 
At the same time, most Americans now use the Internet as their 
primary source for political news.11 PEW Research Center, for 
example, recently found that fifty-five percent of Americans get their 
news from social media often or sometimes, with over half using 
Facebook as a news source.12 Moreover, although some studies 
indicate that many of us are skeptical about what we see on social 
media,13 there seems to be little question that the rampant spread of 
false information nevertheless is harming democracy by fostering 
increasing distrust of candidates and campaigns.14 
 
Internet service providers, however, have been at best half-hearted in 
expressing the will or desire to stem the tide of false political 





9 Id. at 1529 (noting that “fake election news stories on Facebook generated more 
engagements than the top stories from major news outlets” leading up to Election 
Day in 2016).  
10 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News 
Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1148 (2018) (finding that rumors on Twitter travel six 
times faster than truth).  
11 Nunziato, supra note 1, at 1528-29. 
12 Elisa Shearer & Elizabeth Grieco, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social Media 
Sites Play in Delivering the News, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-
media-sites-play-in-delivering-the-news [https://perma.cc/JEZ2-MSNS]. 
13 Elisa Shearer & Katerina Matsa, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-
across-social-media-platforms-2018/#most-social-media-news-consumers-are-
concerned-about-inaccuracy-but-many-still-see-benefits [https://perma.cc/V7KR-
3X7H] (finding that 57% of respondents indicated that “they expect the news they 
see on social media to be largely inaccurate”). 
14 See Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1461 
(2019). 
15 Recently, Facebook has undertaken some efforts to combat false political 
information, including partnering with third-party fact-checkers, deprioritizing 
content that is determined to be false, removing fake accounts, and providing more 
transparency about information sources. Nunziato, supra note 1, at 1538-39. 
According to Nunziato, these efforts are largely modeled after the marketplace of 
ideas theory. Id. at 1546. Twitter has undertaken “less extensive” efforts to combat 
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reasons why they should not get involved. At times, the providers 
attempt to situate themselves as defenders of the American tradition of 
free expression, suggesting that their inaction is consistent with the 
long-held First Amendment theory that it is the marketplace of ideas,16 
and not regulatory bodies, which provides the appropriate mechanism 
to separate truth from falsity.17 At times, they claim that policing the 
Internet for false political speech is simply beyond their capabilities.18 
At times, they suggest that their policing false information would be a 
solution worse than the problem itself.19 As Mark Zuckerberg stated, 
“while I certainly worry about an erosion of truth, I don’t think that 
most people want to live in a world where you can only post things 
that tech companies judge to be 100 percent true.”20  
 
The task of regulating false campaign speech, therefore, is one that, if 
it is to occur at all, will likely fall to the government. And states have 
picked up the mantle, having enacted numerous and diverse statutes 
proscribing particular categories of false campaign speech. One 
category of regulation, for example, makes it a crime to make “false 
statement[s] concerning a candidate” or “the voting record of a 
candidate,”21 such as asserting that a candidate was in favor of tax-
 
false information on its platform. Id. at 1554. Twitter’s efforts have largely focused 
on deleting fake accounts and demoting content from bad actors. Id. at 1549.  
16 Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market.”). 
17 Steven Levy, Zuckerburg Doubles Down on Free Speech – The Facebook Way, 
WIRED (Oct. 17, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/zuckerberg-doubles-
down-free-speech-facebook-way/ [https://perma.cc/Y6RS-TL5X]. 
18 See Bill Wasik, The Internet Dream Became a Nightmare. What will Become of it 
Now?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/13/magazine/internet-future.html 
[https://perma.cc/3Y6Z-3ZJG] (“Phenomenal size had allowed Facebook and its 
fellow American tech giants to become the center of online life, but now they could 
not correct the most toxic problems of online spaces without wielding even more 
unsettling levels of power.”). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (West 2019) (held unconstitutional 
by Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 58 N.E.3d 1188 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)). 
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funded abortions when he was not.22 A second category prohibits lying 
about a candidate’s party affiliation or incumbency status, such as 
falsely claiming that one is an incumbent.23 A third prohibits false 
statements about endorsements, such as claiming that a candidate has 
received an endorsement from a person or organizations when she has 
not.24 A fourth proscribes false statements with respect to ballot 
measures, such as falsely asserting what a ballot proposition entails.25 
A fifth, which is the specific focus of this Article, prohibits false 
statements regarding voting mechanics or procedures, such as when 
persons are misdirected to the polls or falsely told they are ineligible to 
vote because they lack certain qualifications.26 The list is not 
exhaustive.  
 
Yet governmental regulation of false campaign speech also faces 
severe obstacles—most notably the First Amendment. In United States 
v. Alvarez,27 the Court held that false statements of fact may receive 
First Amendment protection even when those statements are uttered 
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard to their truth.28 As 
commentators writing since Alvarez have noted, the decision casts 
doubt on many of the laws that regulate certain kinds of false 





22 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 470 (2016). 
23 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §18350(a) (West 2020). 
24 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 666:6 (2019); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-
19-116(a) (West 2020). 
25 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. §18:1463(c)(1) (2019); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§211B.06 (West 2019). 
26 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-3(12) (West 2019); see also VA. CODE. 
ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (2019). 
27 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
28 Id. at 719 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government 
advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection.”). 
29 See Green, supra note 14, at 1483; see also Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional 
Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 56 (2013); Joshua 
Sellers, Legislating Against Lying in Campaigns and Elections, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 
141, 149-50 (2018); James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A 
Suggested Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions of Lies in 
Political Campaigns, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 179 (2018); Jason Zenor, A Reckless 
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30 and post-31 Alvarez have struck down false campaign speech 
measures under the First Amendment, indicating that the constitutional 
concerns raised by the commentators are very well placed.  
 
There may, however, be a slight dent in the First Amendment armor. 
Recently, the Court in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky32 hinted in 
a footnote that certain types of false campaign speech could 
constitutionally be proscribed. Specifically, the Mansky footnote 
suggested that laws prohibiting “messages intended to mislead voters 
about voting requirements and procedures” would be upheld.33 Mansky 
thus appears to greenlight proposed laws like the Deceptive Practices 
and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2019, which would outlaw 
practices such as knowingly providing false information regarding “the 
time, place, or manner of holding [an] election” or false information 
concerning “the qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility 
for” voting in an election.34 And it would suggest that existing state 
laws that prohibit such practices are constitutional as well.35  
 
Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in Politics, 38 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 41, 71-72 (2016).  
30 Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash. 
1998) (en banc).  
31 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016); 281 Care 
Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014); Magda v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 58 N.E.3d 1188, 1206 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
32 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). 
33 Id. at 1889 n.4; see also Hasen, supra note 29, at 71 (predicting that such a law 
would survive First Amendment scrutiny). 
34 S.1834, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2019). The Act also prohibits false statements 
regarding public endorsements. Id. § 3(a)(3). An analysis of that provision is outside 
the scope of this Article. 
35 See CAL. ELEC. CODE §18543(a) (West 2020) (prohibiting “fraudulently 
advis[ing] any person that [he] is not eligible to vote or is not registered to vote”), 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-363 (West 2019) (prohibiting “incorrect instructions . . . 
as to the manner of voting”), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.0615 (West 2019) (prohibiting 
the use of “knowingly us[ing] false information to (a) [c]hallenge an individual’s 
right to vote”), HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3(12) (West 2019) (prohibiting 
knowingly distributing “false information about the time, date, place, or means of 
voting”); VA. CODE. ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (2019) (prohibiting the communication of 
false information “about the date, time, and place of the election or the voter’s 
precinct, polling place, or voter registration status”) for a few examples of state laws 
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Mansky, of course, is not the last word on the subject, as the 
constitutionality of laws proscribing deceptive campaign practices has 
yet to come directly before the Court. But if the Court upholds 
deceptive campaign practices acts, these acts would provide at least 
one possible weapon against the flood of false information inundating 
the Internet. Moreover, they could also be a particularly important tool 
in combating voter suppression, as false information about voting 
places and voting qualifications has often been specifically targeted at 
minority communities.36  
 
This Article will examine the constitutionality of deceptive campaign 
practices acts under the First Amendment. It will also take the analysis 
one step further by analyzing whether Internet service providers may 
be held liable for the deceptive campaign messages posted by their 
customers and users, similar to the way that providers can be held 
liable for instances of copyright infringement posted by their 
customers and users. 
 
II. FALSE SPEECH ABOUT VOTING REQUIREMENTS AND 
PROCEDURES 
 
Like false campaign speech generally, false campaign speech 
messages intended to “mislead voters about voting requirements and 
procedures”37 are not new. Disseminating false statements about “the 
time, place, or manner of holding election[s]” and about “the 
qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility” are tactics that 
have been commonly used to suppress voter turnout.38 In the 2016 
presidential race, for example, memes styled to look like official 
“Hillary for America” campaign materials circulated on Twitter, 
telling voters that they could avoid long lines on Election Day and 
 
with provisions similar to the proposed Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation 
Prevention Act of 2019. 
36 Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 349 (2010). 
37 Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1889 n.4. 
38 Daniels, supra note 36, at 349, 354-55. 
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“[v]ote from home” by texting “‘Hillary’ to 59925.”39 A similar set of 
memes, some featuring celebrities, also appeared on Facebook.40  
 
In previous elections, other tactics were used, many of which were 
specifically targeted at minority communities.41 For example, one 
stratagem was to circulate false information claiming that, because of 
heavy voting, Republicans were instructed to vote on Tuesdays while 
Democrats should vote on Wednesdays.42 Similarly, another ploy was 
to spread false information that voters could lose certain benefits if 
they voted incorrectly or that a voter could only vote in one election 
per year.43  
 
The problem of misinformation about voting requirements and 
procedures, like the problem of false campaign information generally, 
may be getting worse. By 2018, for example, the practice had become 
so widespread that The New York Times published an Article outlining 
the various ways in which misinformation was designed to create 
confusion on Election Day in 2016 and warning readers to “beware” of 
similar efforts in 2018.44 According to the Times, this misinformation 





39 Madison Kircher, Don’t Believe Those Memes About Texting to Vote for Hillary 
From Home, INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/11/fake-meme-ads-are-telling-people-to-text-to-
vote-for-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/U7RD-43F3]; see also Matt Ford, Is Lying 
About an Election Free Speech or Fraud?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 27, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/150265/lying-election-free-speech-fraud 
[https://perma.cc/ZM7U-CMNB].  
40 Ford, supra note 3; see also Kurt Wagner, These are Some of the Tweets and 
Facebook Ads Russia Used to Try and Influence the 2016 Presidential Election, VOX 
RECODE (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:05 P.M.), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/10/31/16587174/fake-ads-news-propaganda-congress-
facebook-twitter-google-tech-hearing [https://perma.cc/8RVM-4BCX].  
41 Daniels, supra note 36, at 349.  
42 Id. at 343. 
43 Id. at 353. 
44 Kevin Roose, 6 Types of Misinformation to Beware of on Election Day. (And 
What to Do if You Spot Them.), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/politics/misinformation-election-day.html 
[https://perma.cc/K4J2-7SF4].  
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their absentee ballots weren’t counted, to memes circulated on social 
media incorrectly informing voters they could text in their vote, to 
doctored photos depicting long lines and false rumors that ICE agents 
were monitoring polling places.45  
 
There is obviously nothing to be said in favor of these types of tactics. 
They are unbridled and pernicious attempts to suppress voter turnout 
and manipulate election results. That said, the case for regulating this 
type of speech is far more complex than it may initially appear, 
because the case for regulating false campaign speech generally is not 
straightforward. It is therefore necessary to briefly review the 
arguments both in support and opposition of the regulation of false 
campaign speech. 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH REGULATION 
 
In a previous Article examining the constitutionality of false campaign 
speech regulation,46 I set forth a series of arguments that supported and 
opposed false campaign speech regulation. Because others have 
followed that framework,47 a brief canvass of the points set forth in 
that paper may be an appropriate place to begin our analysis.  
 
a. The Arguments in Favor of False Campaign Speech 
Regulation 
 
The arguments supporting false campaign speech regulation are 
substantial. First, and most obviously, false statements distort the 





45 Id.  
46 William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 285 passim (2004). 
47 Hasen, supra note 29, at 63-64 (presenting persuasive advantages as well as 
disadvantages to regulation of false campaign speech). 
48 As the Court stated in Garrison v. Louisiana, “the use of the known lie as a tool is 
at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in 
678 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
for somebody antagonistic to their interests instead of a candidate who 
supports their agenda.49 Further, if the lies are sufficiently widespread, 
they could influence an entire election and not just a handful of voters’ 
ballots. 
 
Second, false statements debase campaign discourse.50 An election 
beset by lies can quickly degenerate into charges and countercharges 
on veracity. The result misleads and distracts the voters, and perhaps 
the candidates, from more serious and substantive campaign issues.51  
 
Third, false statements may weaken democracy by fostering voter 
cynicism.52 An alienated electorate is one rife for manipulation.53 An 
electorate that does not trust the integrity of the political system may 
become disengaged and indifferent to its own responsibilities of self-
governance.54  
 
Fourth, unrestrained false statements inflict reputational and emotional 
injuries on existing political actors and can deter qualified individuals 
from entering the political fray.55 These harms, moreover, are not only 
exacted on individual targets. As many have argued, unmitigated 
 
which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.” 379 U.S. 64, 75 
(1964). 
49 See Green, supra note 14, at 1457-58 (a voter who has been misled not only has 
had her own vote nullified but also has her vote turned against her). 
50 Zenor, supra note 29, at 47; see also Evan Richman, Deception in Political 
Advertising: The Clash Between the First Amendment and Defamation Law, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 670 (1998) (Deceit in political advertising “lowers 
the level of political conversation”). 
51 Zenor, supra note 29, at 47-49. 
52 Green, supra note 14, at 1460. 
53 Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
54 Green, supra note 14, at 1461 (“If the voting public is defrauded by morphed 
campaign speech, our system of elections is effectively destroyed. Rampant and 
unchecked counterfeit campaign speech undermines faith in candidates and political 
campaigns, causing voters to distrust anything any candidate says or does that they 
do not witness in person. The damage to the democratic electoral process is 
existential.”). 
55 Id. at 1466. 
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falsehoods about political leaders undermines the fabric of 
communities in addition to injuring the leaders themselves.56  
 
Fifth, false speech about voting requirements and procedures raises 
another, more specific, harm.57 As Gilda Daniels notes, “the 
distribution of misinformation regarding the time, place, and manner 
of elections” often seeks to “misinform unwanted minority, elderly, 
disabled, and language-minority voters in an effort to” cause confusion 
and depress democratic participation.58 Accordingly, such speech is 
akin to voter suppression and intimidation and, therefore, directly 
implicates the right to vote.59  
 
Finally, there is a sixth rationale that, unfortunately, has only become 
more apparent since my earlier Article was written—the need to 
protect truth itself. As some observers have noted, we have moved into 
a “post-truth” era where the value of truth itself has come under 
attack.60 In this new era, what a person desires to be true has, for some, 
become the only truth that matters—with the result that the normative 
distinctions between truth and lies have been significantly damaged.61 
Laws, in whatever form, that seek to reinforce the value of truth may 





56 See Robert H. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CALIF. 
L. REV. 743, 745 (1986) (“To a considerable degree the reputation of a community is 
reflected in the reputation of its representative figures. Indeed, it is the founders and 
heroes of a community that to a considerable extent give it its identity, and it is the 
memory of the sufferings and achievements of exemplary figures that constitutes a 
community as a community of memory and keeps that community alive.”); see also 
Gerald Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085, 1094 (2012). 
57 This harm was not addressed in my previous article. 
58 Daniels, supra note 36, at 348-49. 
59 Id. at 348-52. 
60 LEE MCINTYRE, POST TRUTH 5 (2018). 
61 Id. 
62 On the value of truth generally, see John M. Finnis, Skepticism, Self-Refutation 
and the Good of Truth, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
HLA HART 247, 250 (PMS Hacker & J. Raz, eds., Clarendon Press 1977) 247, 250. 
On the value of truth in First Amendment jurisprudence see, William P. Marshall, In 
680 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
b. The Arguments Against 
 
The arguments against regulating false campaign speech are also 
substantial.63 First, the harms to the voters caused by false campaign 
speech may be overly exaggerated.64 Voters are often already skeptical 
about what they hear on the campaign trail so they may not be as 
vulnerable to false assertions as one might initially assume.65 As Rick 
Hasen points out, “most voters don’t expect honesty from their 
politicians.”66 Further, false claims seldom go unchallenged in the 
campaign arena because there is generally an opponent ready to 
expose the deception.67 Thus, it is possible that, as Justice Breyer has 
optimistically argued, “in this area more accurate information will 
normally counteract the lie.”68 
 
Second, regulating campaign speech is troublesome because of the 
inherent nature of campaign discourse. Campaigns are volatile and 
vitriolic, and they inevitably involve constant attacks and 
counterattacks. In such a heated atmosphere, there is more than a mere 
possibility that a candidate will misrepresent, overstate, and/or 
deliberately lie.69 Allowing for the sanctioning of false statements 
uttered in the heat of battle, therefore, runs up against political reality. 
 
Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 
(1995). 
63 Marshall, supra note 46, at 293-300. 
64 Hasen, supra note 29, at 63-64. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 77 n.115 (citing Jack Schafer, Looking for Truth in All the Wrong Places, 
REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/jackshafer/2012/08/31/looking-
for-truth-in-all-the-wrong-places/. 
67 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982). 
68 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 738 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). The 
accuracy of Justice Breyer’s observation is of course questionable given the current 
state of political discourse.  
69 The actual malice standard comes from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254. In that case the Court ruled that protecting falsehoods uttered without 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard was necessary in order to assure that 
speakers were not chilled in exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. at 279-81. 
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Third, prosecuting false campaign speech may not be an effective way 
of informing the voters because the process of resolving the action is 
likely to take longer than the election cycle itself. That means that, 
unless officials upend an election result, the resolution of whether a 
campaign statement was true or false will not occur until it is too late 
to affect a voter’s decision.70  
 
Fourth, campaign speech regulation is a tool that actors can weaponize 
for political gain.71 Charging an individual with disseminating false 
statements is not always only about correcting the record.72 It is often a 
political stratagem in and of itself. As the Court recognized in Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus,73 the “practical effect” of a false statement 
scheme can be “to permit a private complainant . . . to gain a campaign 
advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a statement.”74  
 
Last, and certainly most importantly, regulating false campaign speech 
raises serious First Amendment concerns.75 To begin with, any 
regulation of political speech necessarily faces a high barrier because, 
as the Court has frequently noted, political speech lies at the heart of 
the First Amendment.76 Accordingly, any regulation of political speech 





70 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
under Ohio’s false political speech law “there is no guarantee the administrative or 
criminal proceedings will conclude before the election”). 
71 See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that 
complaints under Minnesota’s false campaign speech law can be carefully timed to 
“inflict[] political damage”); see also Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 475 (explaining that 
Ohio’s false campaign speech law fails to eliminate “frivolous complaints” that 
could be used as a political weapon). 
72 Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 475 (noting that complaints can be timed to “achieve 
maximum disruption”). 
73 573 U.S. 149 (2014). 
74 Id. at 165. 
75 Marshall, supra note 46, at 308. 
76 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free 
discussion of political affairs.”); see also Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002) (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Central 
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Moreover, regulating false campaign speech is especially problematic 
under the First Amendment because it places the government in the 
business of evaluating what is true and false in politics. This regulation 
not only raises the practical concern that arises from allowing 
potentially self-interested political actors (government officials) to 
become the foxes charged with supervising the political henhouse, but 
it also raises the theoretical objection that in a democracy it should be 
the people, not the government, who are the judges of political truth. 
As the Court has stated, “every person must be his watchman for truth, 
because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the 
true from the false for us.”78 
 
IV. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF FALSE 
CAMPAIGN SPEECH REGULATION 
 
Given these concerns, my previous Article concluded that the case for 
upholding the constitutionality of laws proscribing false campaign 
speech was ambiguous at best.79 This ambiguity was so even though 
Supreme Court decisions at that time had indicated that false 
statements uttered with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth, were not constitutionally 
protected.80 My conclusion, however, was neither surprising nor novel. 
The United States Supreme Court had previously indicated that any 
regulation of campaign speech would face serious obstacles,81 and the 
 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-223 (1989) (“Debate on the qualifications of candidates 
is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms, not at 
the edges.”)). 
77 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (leaving open the 
possibility that laws restricting political processes may be subject to “more exacting 
judicial scrutiny”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (subjecting 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements to exacting scrutiny because they burden 
political speech).  
78 Thomas v. Collins, 324 U.S 516, 545 (1945). 
79 Marshall, supra note 46, at 308. 
80 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 129, 171 (1979); 
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1982). 
81 Brown, 456 U.S. 45 at 56. 
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Washington State Supreme Court had already struck down a false 
campaign statute on First Amendment grounds.82 
 
If there was any doubt, however, then two United States Supreme 
Court cases decided since I wrote my previous Article have placed 
false campaign speech regulation on even more precarious grounds. 
First, and most notably, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Alvarez83 held for the first time that a deliberate lie, that is a statement 
uttered with actual malice, was protected under the First 
Amendment.84 In so holding, the Court undermined the most obvious 
defense of a false campaign speech statute, i.e., that deliberate falsity 
does not merit constitutional protection. In Alvarez, however, as 
Justice Alito explained in his dissent, the Court departed from its long-
held rule “that false statements of fact merit no First Amendment 
protection in their own right.”85 
 
At issue in Alvarez was the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act 
(“Act”), which criminalizes false representations claiming that one has 
“been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the 
Armed Forces of the United States.”86 The defendant, Xavier Alvarez, 
falsely claimed he had earned the Congressional Medal of Honor,87 
and was accordingly prosecuted under the Act.88 Alvarez pled guilty 
but reserved his right to appeal the conviction on the grounds that the 
application of the Stolen Valor Act violated his First Amendment 





82 State of Washington v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (1998).  
83 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
84 Id. at 724. 
85 Id. at 748-49 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
86 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2018) (invalidated by Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724). 
87 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713 (plurality opinion). The defendant also claimed he had 
played for the Detroit Red Wings and dated a Mexican starlet. Id.  
88 Id. at 714. The Stolen Valor Act also has enhanced penalties for false claims about 
the Congressional Medal of Honor, stating that “the offender shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1).  
89 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 714 (plurality opinion). 
90 Id. at 730. 
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Kennedy’s opinion for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor applied strict scrutiny and found the Act 
unconstitutional.91 Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice 
Kagan, reached the same result but rested on intermediate, rather than 
strict scrutiny.92 Justice Alito dissented and was joined in his opinion 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas.93 
 
Justice Kennedy’s primary rationale in striking down the Act was one 
that we have already visited—the problem with the government’s 
policing truth. As Kennedy wrote,  
 
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a 
criminal offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or 
made in a barely audible whisper, would endorse 
government authority to compile a list of subjects about 
which false statements are punishable. That 
governmental power has no clear limiting principle. 
Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that 
we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.94 
 
To be sure, Justice Kennedy did not suggest that deliberate falsity must 
always be protected. Rather, he suggested that crimes like perjury or 
falsely claiming to be a government officer were actions that could 
still be proscribed.95 But his opinion made clear that the types of false 
speech that could permissibly be prohibited would be a strictly limited 
category.96 
 
Justice Kennedy’s Alvarez opinion did not address false campaign 
speech regulation, although it had obvious implications for that 





91 Id. at 715.  
92 Id. at 730-31 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
93 Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 
(1949) (Centennial ed. 2003)). 
95 Id. at 719-20. 
96 Id. 
2020] MARSHALL 685 
 
 
concurrence.97 After first recognizing the harms that false campaign 
speech can engender, such as “leading the listeners to vote for the 
speaker,”98 Breyer nonetheless went on to express serious doubt that 
such laws could avoid constitutional invalidation without significant 
narrowing.99 As he explained, “criminal prosecution is particularly 
dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential election result) and 
consequently can more easily result in censorship of speakers and their 
ideas.”100 Further, Breyer continued, because of the nature of the 
political process, “in this area more accurate information will normally 
counteract the lie.”101  
 
The second Supreme Court case shedding doubt on the 
constitutionality of false campaign regulations was Susan B. Anthony 
List v. Driehaus.102 Driehaus was a direct attack on a state’s (Ohio’s) 
false campaign speech law,103 but the actual question addressed by the 
Court was whether a pre-enforcement challenge to the statute was ripe 
for review and not whether the statute itself violated the First 
Amendment.104 Nevertheless, a fair reading of Driehaus also indicates 
that the Court holds strong reservations about the validity of false 
campaign speech regulation. For example, in finding the case ripe, the 





97 Id. at 738 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
98 Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. Notably, Breyer’s opinion cited two examples of cases in which sanctions of 
campaign speech were upheld, but he refused to express an opinion as to whether he 
agreed with those results. The examples were United We Stand America, Inc. v. 
United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F. 3d 86, 93 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(upholding against First Amendment challenge application of Lanham Act to a 
political organization) and Treasurer of the Comm. to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. 
Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 389 N.W. 2d 446 (1986) (upholding under First 
Amendment statute prohibiting campaign material falsely claiming that one is an 
incumbent). Id. (case parentheticals provided by Justice Breyer). 
102 573 U.S. 149 (2014), remanded to 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2014). 
103 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.21(B)  
104 Id. at 167-68. On remand, the Sixth Circuit found the law to be unconstitutional. 
Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 476. 
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tool of political weaponry rather than as a vehicle to separate truth 
from falsity in campaign discourse.105 As the Court explained:  
 
The credibility of [the threat of enforcement] is 
bolstered by the fact that authority to file a complaint 
with the Commission is not limited to a prosecutor or 
an agency. Instead, the false statement statute allows 
“any person” with knowledge of the purported violation 
to file a complaint. Because the universe of potential 
complainants is not restricted to state officials who are 
constrained by explicit guidelines or ethical obligations, 
there is a real risk of complaints from, for example, 
political opponents.106 
 
Alvarez and Driehaus thus echoed the objections to false campaign 
regulations noted above. False campaign speech regulation is 
problematic because 1) it allows government to police political truth 
(Alvarez plurality opinion107); 2) it ignores the First Amendment 
principle that the answer to false speech is more speech and that, in the 
context of political campaigns especially, lies will seldom go 
unanswered (Breyer’s Alvarez concurrence108); and 3) it is potentially 
harmful because it can be used for political weaponry (Driehaus109). 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that since these cases were decided, 






105 Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 164.  
106 Id. (citations omitted); see also 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 
(8th Cir. 2014) (“Complaints can be filed at a tactically calculated time so as to 
divert the attention of an entire campaign . . . thus inflicting political damage.”).  
107 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
108 See id. at 738 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
109 See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 165. 
110 See, e.g., Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 476 (invalidating Ohio false campaign speech 
statute); see also Arneson, 766 F.3d at 785 (invalidating Minnesota statute 
prohibiting false campaign speech about a ballot initiative); Commonwealth v. 
Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1257 (Mass. 2015) (invalidating Massachusetts false 
campaign speech statute); Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 58 N.E.3d 1188, 1206 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (invalidating Ohio false campaign speech statute in light of 
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Given this background, it might be considered unexpected that the 
Court in Minnesota Voter Alliance v. Mansky suggested that false 
speech about voting requirements and procedures could be 
proscribed.111 Mansky itself concerned a Minnesota law that forbade 
voters from wearing “a political badge, political button, or anything 
bearing political insignia inside a polling place on Election Day.”112 
The law, at least on its face, had nothing to do with false campaign 
speech. Rather, the central purpose of the law, as explained by the 
State, was to prevent disruption around polling places.113  
 
The State had also argued, however, that the law served the interest of 
preventing voter confusion because certain political apparel, such as 
“Please I.D. Me” buttons worn by some voters, could be used “to 
confuse other voters about whether they needed photo identification to 
vote.”114 The Court rejected this argument on grounds that the statute, 
by its terms, was not directed at avoiding voter confusion115 but was 
aimed instead at last-minute electioneering about the issues and 
candidates before the voters in the current election.116 Nevertheless, 
the Court in a footnote addressed the State’s point about combating 
voter confusion, stating that it had no doubt “that the State may 
 
Alvarez and Driehaus). But see Linert v. MacDonald, 901 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2017) (holding that Minnesota’s law prohibiting false statements about 
endorsements was not unconstitutionally overbroad); City of Grant v. Smith, No. 
A16–1070, 2017 WL 957717, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. March 13, 2017) (holding that 
Minnesota’s law prohibiting false statements about endorsements was narrowly 
tailored and did not violate the First Amendment). In Linert, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals distinguished the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez by 
stating that, while the Supreme Court was unconvinced that counterspeech could not 
remedy false statements about military awards, the Minnesota Court of Appeals had 
previously “concluded that counterspeech is not an effective and less-restrictive 
means” to remedy false statements about endorsements. Linert, 901 N.W.2d at 669-
70.  
111 Notably, however, Rick Hasen had earlier predicted this result. Hasen, supra note 
29, at 71. 
112 Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (2018). 
113 Id. at 1887-88. 
114 Id. at 1889 n.4. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1887. 
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prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting 
requirements and procedures.”117 The Court did not offer any reason 
why this might be so. 
 
In fact, there are reasons why false campaign speech regulation about 
voting requirements and procedures can be distinguished from false 
campaign speech regulation laws that more broadly proscribe false 
speech about candidates or issues. First and undoubtedly most 
importantly, false campaign speech about voting requirements and 
procedures can directly interfere with the right to vote.118 A voter 
misdirected to the polls or a voter misled into believing that she needs 
particular qualifications or documents to vote may end up never 
exercising the franchise. As such, false campaign speech of this type is 
akin to voter suppression and voter intimidation and thus implicates 
the state’s interests of the highest order.119 Second, as Rick Hasen 
points out, information about voting requirements and procedures are 
immediately verifiable and not subject to the same sorts of partisan 
interpretation that statements about candidates might be.120 Third, 
because much of this type of speech occurs on or close to Election 
Day, there is often no time for truthful counter-speech to remedy the 
false speech.121 Fourth, there is little concern that such prohibitions 
would, or could, deter legitimate speech.122 
 
Whether these distinctions should actually make a difference for 
constitutional analysis, however, is debatable. For example, the state 





117 Id. at 1889 n.4. 
118 Hasen, supra note 29, at 7; see also Daniels, supra note 36, at 350. 
119 Daniels, supra note 36, at 350 (making the tie-in to voter suppression). 
120 Hasen, supra note 29, at 71. As Hasen points out, however, the question of 
whether a particular statement about voting requirements is true or false is not 
always clear cut. Id. at 71-72. Thus, Hasen raises the example of a poster circulated 
at the University of Wisconsin that stated: “Vote at the polling place of your choice” 
as an instance where a potentially misleading direction about voting is not 
necessarily false. Id. at 72. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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concern, but it should also be noted that the harm in deterring a person 
from voting is, in some ways, a lesser harm than that caused by 
misleading the person into voting for the wrong candidate. Deterring a 
Candidate Smith supporter costs Candidate Smith one vote, but 
misleading a Candidate Smith supporter into voting for Candidate 
Jones costs Candidate Smith two votes—the vote not given to her and 
the vote given instead to her opponent.123  
 
Additionally, the other harms associated with false speech about 
voting requirements and procedures may not distinguish that type of 
false speech from other forms of false speech as might be presumed. 
Some false claims about candidates, for example, can be easily 
verifiable, such as an assertion that a candidate was arrested and/or 
convicted of a crime.124 Similarly, like false assertions about voting 
requirements or procedures, some false claims about candidates are 
also disseminated when there is not time for truthful speech to combat 
the lie.125  
 
V. HOLDING INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS LIABLE 
 
Nevertheless, taking the Court at its word, let us assume that false 
assertions about voting requirements and procedures can be 





123 See Green, supra note 14, at 1457-58 (“Imagine a voter who views multiple 
counterfeited speeches of a candidate and decides to vote for that candidate based on 
the falsified positions . . . . Imagine further that the candidate she has voted for in 
fact holds views dramatically opposed to her own. Her right to vote has been 
nullified; worse, it has been turned against her.”). 
124 For example, in September 2019, false posts circulated on social media asserting 
that Democratic presidential candidate Beto O’Rourke is “a felon who is not allowed 
to possess a firearm of any type” after O’Rourke proposed a mandatory gun buyback 
program. Amanda Seitz, False Claim Suggests Beto O’Rourke Was Convicted of a 
Felony, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/afs:Content:7467080601 [https://perma.cc/P4SJ-KB43].  
125 See generally Green, supra note 14, at 1488; see also Robert Chesney & Danielle 
Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1776 (2019) (explaining that deep fakes can harm 
society through “[a] fake audio clip [that] ‘reveal[s]’ criminal behavior by a 
candidate on the eve of an election,” for example).  
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question as to how effective such a regulation would be. At best, given 
the reality of how false campaign information is disseminated, 
sanctioning only the individuals who are responsible for authoring the 
false information would address only part of the problem.  
 
To begin with, there is a question of deterrence. Because much of false 
campaign speech tends to be anonymous, its perpetrators may be hard 
to find, leading to the question of whether such a statute can provide 
meaningful deterrence. More importantly, because spreading false 
information manually is difficult—leaflets and posted signs are not the 
most efficient methods of communication—anybody seeking to widely 
spread false information effectively is likely to seek other methods of 
distribution. Enter the Internet. Internet service providers both protect 
anonymity and can more widely disseminate false messages. They are 
thus primed to be the vehicles of choice for those wanting to distribute 
the false information.126 
 
For the exact same reasons, it makes sense to prioritize Internet service 
providers as prosecutorial targets. First, they are not anonymous, 
meaning the threat of prosecution could have a real deterrent effect, as 
potential defendants will not be able to hide behind anonymity.127 
Second, because of their ability to disseminate messages widely, 
Internet service providers can cause the greater harm.128 Third, holding 
Internet service providers liable would have effects that would go 
beyond a single election cycle, meaning that even if sanctioning the 
provider might not always be timely enough to affect the election in 





126 This is particularly true given the automated nature of content dissemination on 
Internet platforms. For example, the technology put in place by Internet service 
providers often allows nonhuman bots to flood hashtags with false information or 
make false information “trend” on social media. Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, 
Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 999-1000 (2019). 
127 Cf. MGM Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 1003 (2005) (noting with 
respect to copyright, “it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work 
effectively against all [copyright] infringers” on a widely used service. and that “the 
only practical alternative [may be] to go against the distributor of the copying device 
for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.”). 
128 See Lamo & Calo, supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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charge might not be fully adjudicated before the election is over),129 it 
could still provide effective disincentive against the provider’s 
spreading false information in future elections. Further, a formal 
decision that a particular representation was false (such as an assertion 
that a voter will lose certain benefits if she votes twice in a year)130 
would have the additional benefit of undermining a similar false 
assertion if one were advanced in a future election.  
 
The conclusion that it makes sense from a policy perspective to subject 
Internet service providers to liability for spreading false information, 
however, leads to the obvious next question. Would holding them 
liable be legally permissible even in light of the Mansky footnote? 
Three issues arise. First, can an Internet service provider be held liable 
when it is not the source of the objectionable material? Second, if so, 
what should be the scienter requirement for triggering liability? Third, 
what mechanisms should be put in place that would allow the requisite 
scienter to be established?  
 
The first issue, whether an Internet service provider can be held liable 
when it is not the source of the objectionable material, can be readily 
resolved. The law is clear that so-called “communications 
intermediaries” may be held liable for the communications of others, 
at least in certain circumstances.131 The fact that Internet service 





129 This is not to deny that there could be benefits within the election cycle itself. A 
prosecution for disseminating false information about voting requirements and 
procedures could immediately serve to alert the voters about the potentially 
deceptive tactics. 
130 Daniels, supra note 36, at 353. 
131 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical 
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 43 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 373, 396-98 (2010) (noting a communications 
intermediary who “publishes a statement by another bears the same liability for the 
statement as if he or she had initially created it,” while a communications 
intermediary who distributes information is held liable if “they know or have reason 
to know” of the nature of the information). 
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messages themselves, then, does not automatically immunize them 
from liability.132  
 
Copyright law, for example, routinely imposes liability upon 
intermediaries.133 In copyright law, liability may be imposed on a 
communications intermediary when the defendant 1) has the “right and 
ability to supervise the infringing conduct”134 and 2) has “an obvious 
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials.”135 Significantly, although knowledge is required for a 
defendant to be found contributorily liable, knowledge of the 
infringement is not required to trigger vicarious liability.136 
 
Another example is obscenity law. Obscenity law permits the 
sanctioning of intermediaries who sell obscene material, not just those 
who originate the obscene material.137 Further, the intermediaries only 
need to have notice of the character and nature of the content to be 
subject to penalty.  They do not need to know the materials are 





132 But see Wash. Post Co. v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 523 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(indicating reluctance to subject third-party internet service providers to laws 
designed to promote election accountability). In McManus, the Fourth Circuit held 
that Maryland’s requirements that online platforms hosting political advertisements 
maintain publicly accessible records about the ads that they run and provide records 
about those ads to the Maryland State Board of Elections upon request were 
unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs. Id. Specifically, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the requirements unconstitutionally compelled the plaintiffs to 
engage in political speech. Id. at 514-15. 
133 MGM Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“One infringes 
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and 
infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to 
exercise the right to stop or limit it.”). 
134 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04(2) (2019). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 121-22 (1974). 
138 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court means “notice” to be “knowledge” or 
actual notification. In Smith v. California, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
California statute which held booksellers liable for possessing obscene material 
without scienter because the statute punished booksellers “even though they had not 
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Defamation law offers another example. In common law defamation, a 
republisher, defined as one who has the “knowledge, opportunity, and 
ability to exercise editorial control over the content of its 
publications;” or, in other words, one who “cooperate[s] actively in the 
publication”139 could be held liable for disseminating libelous material, 
even if the republisher was not the source of the information.140 This 
was true, moreover, even if the republisher was not aware of the 
defamatory content.141  
 
To be sure, First Amendment law has altered common law defamation 
rules affecting communications intermediaries in some important 
respects. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requires that a republisher act 
with actual malice, meaning with knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth, in order to be held liable, at least with respect to 
defamatory actions brought by public figures regarding matters of 
public concern.142 Further, Gertz v. Welch held that even in the case of 
a libel action brought by a private figure, some degree of scienter was 
required.143 However, Sullivan and Gertz left the basic republication 
 
the slightest notice of the character of the books they sold.” 361 U.S. 147, 153-55 
(1959). In Hamling v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified the holding 
in Smith, rejecting the argument that it is constitutionally required for a defendant to 
know materials are obscene to be held liable: “[i]t is constitutionally sufficient that 
the prosecution show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials 
he distributed, and he knew the character and nature of the materials.” 418 U.S. 87, 
123 (1974). 
139 Ardia, supra note 131, at 397; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §581 cmt. 
g (1977). 
140 Ardia, supra note 131, at 397.  
141 Id. at 397-98; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §581 cmt. d-e. 
Additionally, at common law, a mere distributor, which is distinguishable from a 
publisher because it is under no duty to examine the content it intermediates, could 
also be held liable if it had notice of the defamatory content. Ardia, supra note 131, 
at 398.  
142 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In Gertz v. Welch 
the Court ruled that although a private figure plaintiff need not show actual malice in 
order to prevail in a defamation action, it would at least have to show negligence. 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Gertz was a direct action against the source of the 
defamation and did not involve a communications intermediary. Id at 325. 
143 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. 
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rule in place—communications intermediaries can be held liable for 
the defamatory content of the original speaker.144 
 
It is also true that current law grants Internet service providers specific 
statutory protections that other communications intermediaries do not 
enjoy. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), for 
example, provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider," thus 
effectively protecting Internet service providers from republication 
liability.145 Thus, Section 230, in its current form, would likely shield 
Internet service providers from liability for disseminating false 
information about voting requirements and procedures that was not 
propagated by the Internet service provider itself. Accordingly, any 
attempt to regulate Internet service providers for disseminating false 





144 See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 
(1985) (holding that a speaker may be subject to strict liability when the speech does 
not involve a public figure and a matter of public concern). 
145 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1) (2018). Section 230 does not, however, immunize 
providers from copyright law. Id. § 230(e)(2). 
146 Whether CDA 230 should be more broadly amended to reduce Internet service 
provider immunity is, of course, currently a matter of substantial debate. It is notable, 
however, that the provision has recently been amended to weaken Internet service 
provider immunity to address sex trafficking concerns. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).  
Other revisions have also been proposed. For example, Danielle Keats Citron and 
Benjamin Wittes recommend granting immunity only to a service actor who “takes 
reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its services once warned 
about such uses.” Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just 
Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 467-72 
(2018); cf. Ryan Gerdes, Scaling Back §230 Immunity: Why the Communications 
Decency Act Should Take a Page From the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
Service Provider Immunity Playbook, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 673 (2012) 
(suggesting Congress should adopt an “opt-in requirement” where users are required 
to provide personal information in order to eliminate anonymity as well as a “notice” 
requirement where providers can be held liable if they know the content is 
defamatory); Patricia Spiccia, Note, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why 
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned 
and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U.L. REV. 369, 411 (2013) (proposing a “notice-and-
takedown provision” where a neutral FCC division evaluates complaints and 
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Copyright law also insulates internet service providers, although to a 
lesser degree. Although Section 230 does not apply to copyright 
law,147 Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides 
an internet service provider with a safe harbor if, after receiving notice 
of infringing content on their platforms, it “expeditiously” takes down 
the material in accordance with the proper statutory procedure.148 
Additionally, the Internet service provider is not liable if it removes 
content that is ultimately determined to be non-infringing or if it puts 
content back up after receiving counter-notice that the material is non-
infringing.149 Nevertheless, to reemphasize, both Sections 230 and 512 
are only statutory protections, and neither disrupts the basic 
understanding that communications intermediaries can be subject to 
liability for the content of the original speaker.  
 
Having established, then, that communications intermediaries such as 
Internet service providers can be held liable, the next question is what 
level of scienter should be required? Should knowledge be required as 
 
determines whether the Internet service provider should remove the content; a failure 
to remove the content once notified would result in a forfeiture of § 230 immunity). 
  
Some have also suggested that Section 230 should simply be reinterpreted to limit 
Internet service provider immunity in certain situations. Citron and Wittes, for 
example, suggest an interpretive shift in the precedent, suggesting “courts should not 
apply Section 230’s safe harbor unless the claims relate to the publication of user-
generated content.” Citron & Wittes, supra note 146, at 467-72; see also Yaffa A. 
Meeran, Note, As Justice So Requires: Making the Case for a Limited Reading of § 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257, 278 
(2018) (proposing courts adopt a two-part test in order to determine the scope of § 
230 immunity: (1) “whether the cause of action treats the interactive computer 
service as a publisher or speaker of third-party content” and (2) if the service 
provider is neither a publisher nor speaker, “the court must then determine whether 
the interactive computer service is also acting as an information content provider—if 
it is, § 230’s immunity protections do not apply”); Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary 
Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 203 (2018) (“propos[ing] that courts 
scrutinize the manner in which providers in each case elicit user content and the 
extent to which they exploit that data in secondary or ancillary markets.”). 
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2018). 
148 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2018). 
149 Id. § 512(g)(4). 
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is the case with obscenity150 or defamation, or is liability without 
knowledge possible as is the case with copyright? The more likely 
answer is that a court would find the copyright example inapposite. To 
begin with, the case law establishes that the First Amendment is not as 
rigorously applied in the context of copyright infringement as it is in 
other areas.151 More importantly, Alvarez strongly suggests that if false 
statements are to be punishable at all, a requirement that the speaker 
act with actual malice would appear to be a bare minimum.152  
 
The copyright example, however, might be helpful in providing an 
illustration as to how to respond to our third issue, the types of 
mechanisms that could be put in place to allow the state to establish 
the scienter requirement. Recall that Section 512 imposes liability on 
Internet service providers if they do not take down the offending 
material once they have received notice of the infringement.153 In 
order to make this system work, 512 requires that the provider have an 
agent designated to receive notice of possible copyright violations.154 
A similar mechanism could be used with respect to false information 
about voting requirements and procedures. An Internet service 
provider could be required to have a designated agent to whom 
complaints about false campaign speech regarding voting requirements 
and procedures should be sent. If the Internet service provider does not 





150 As explained earlier, a communications intermediary cannot be liable if she does not have 
knowledge of the character of the disseminated materials even if she does not know the 
materials are legally obscene.  See supra note 138. 
151 Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 165 (1998) (concluding granting 
preliminary injunctions is more favorable in copyright claims than most other cases). 
152 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring speech 
outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless 
falsehood.”). 
153 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(C) (2018). 
154 Id. § 512(c)(2). 
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information, it could then be deemed as acting with actual malice; i.e., 
knowledge of falsity or requisite disregard for the truth.155  
 
To be sure, there is a significant First Amendment hurdle standing in 
the way of this approach. In St. Amant v. Thompson the Court held that 
failure to investigate was not itself indicia of actual malice.156 
Accordingly, an Internet service provider could argue, in light of St. 
Amant, that even after it received notice of a potential violation, it did 
not act with the requisite actual malice if it did not investigate.  
 
This argument is not unsubstantial. However, holding that an Internet 
service provider acts with actual malice if it receives notice of falsity 
yet refuses to take down the offending material is not outside the mark. 
In Harte-Hanks Communications v Connaughton, the Court held that a 





155 This is not to suggest that all aspects of Section 512 should be included in a law 
that regulates false information about voting requirements and procedures. For 
example, 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(4) provides that an Internet service provider who 
continues to display the allegedly infringing material is nevertheless immune from an 
infringement action if, after receiving notice of a purported infringement, it receives 
a counter notification claiming the material does not violate the copyright laws even 
if it is later determined that material was an infringement. Whether a similar 
immunity should be granted to an Internet service provider who disseminates false 
information about voting requirements and procedures, however, is debatable 
because offering that immunity would de-incentivize the provider from taking down 
the false information. Rather, it would allow the Internet service provider (without 
the threat of liability) to continue to display false information even when the counter-
notice claiming the posted information is true was itself actually shown to be false.  
At the same time, including a provision like 17 U.S.C § 512(g)(1) could be 
beneficial. Unlike Section 512(g)(4), which protects providers when they continue to 
display offending material, 512(g)(1) shields Internet service providers from liability 
when they take down allegedly copyright infringing material “regardless of whether 
the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.” Providing similar 
protections to Internet service providers for taking down allegedly false information 
regarding voting requirements and procedures makes similar sense because it 
removes a disincentive for taking down false material.  
156 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968) (“Failure to investigate does 
not itself establish bad faith.”). 
698 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
held liable for reckless disregard.157 Under Connaughton, then, it 
follows that a party can be found to have presumptively acted with 
actual malice (reckless disregard) if it continues to disseminate false 
information about voting requirements and procedures after being 
notified that the information is untrue.158 If so, then the case is a strong 
one that holding Internet service providers liable for disseminating 
false information about voting requirements and procedures is 
consistent with the First Amendment. The Mansky footnote, in short, 
can then be construed as opening the door to internet service provider 
liability as well as to the liability of the individual actors who fabricate 
the false information in the first place. 
 
This is not to say that holding internet service providers liable for 
disseminating false information about voting requirements and 
procedures will stem the flood of false political information inundating 
the internet. Deliberate lies about voting requirements and procedures, 
after all, comprise only a fraction of campaign misrepresentations. But 
it is a start; and in that respect, it is notable that while this Article was 
in publication, YouTube agreed to take down false information of the 





157 Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692-93 (1989) 
(“Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, 
the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category . . . . This evidence of 
an intent to avoid the truth was not only sufficient to convince the plurality that there 
had been an extreme departure from professional publishing standards, but it was 
also sufficient to satisfy the more demanding New York Times [Co.] standards . . . 
.”). 
158 Different jurisdictions have suggested that notification, or lack thereof, could be 
indicative of whether the defendant had actual malice. See Colombo v. Times-Argus 
Ass’n, 135 Vt. 454, 457 (1977) (“There is no evidence in the record . . . to support a 
finding that the defendants had knowledge of any falsity in the articles in question . . 
. . Defendant . . . denied any notice that the statements were false.”) (emphasis 
added); Yeager v. TRW Inc., 984 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (“There can be 
no question that the defendant lacked the requisite intent, when the defendant ‘was 
not even put on notice that its report contained inaccurate information until [a date 
after its original publication.]’”) (emphasis added). 
159 Davey Alba, YouTube Says It Will Ban Misleading Election-Related Content, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/technology/youtube-misinformation-
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would send an important message—the Internet is not an untouchable 
haven for deliberate lies. As such, the regulatory attempt may be worth 
the effort even if it only scratches the surface. Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, to the extent such a law prevents voters from being 
deceived into voting at the wrong place or time or tricked into not 
voting at all, it accomplishes one of the government’s most important 
functions—protecting the right to vote.160 Internet service providers 
should not be immune when they knowingly disseminate false 




Although the proliferation of false campaign speech, particularly on 
the Internet, poses a serious risk to the integrity of the electoral 
process, its regulation also presents serious policy and First 
Amendment concerns. After all, the contention that in a democracy the 
government should not be the arbiter of political truth is a powerful 
one. Recently, however, the Supreme Court indicated that at least one 
form of false campaign speech could appropriately be subject to 
government sanction.161 According to the Court, a law that proscribed 
“messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and 
procedures” would be upheld.162 
 
This Article proposes to take the Court’s assertion regarding false 
information about voting requirements and procedures one step 
further. Not only should false information about voting requirements 
and procedures be proscribed but, more controversially, sanctions 
should be extended to internet service providers who disseminate the 
 
election.html [https://perma.cc/HP4U-WJ9S]. Similarly, according to Facebook, the 
company will increase its efforts to remove misinformation about voting 
requirements and procedures ahead of the 2018 midterm elections. Helping to 
Protect the 2020 U.S. Elections, FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/update-on-election-integrity-efforts/ 
[https://perma.cc/X2YL-WCE9]. 
160 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution 
of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote.”). 
161 Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018). 
162 Id. 
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false information. No doubt this measure standing by itself would not 
transform the Internet. But it would accomplish two important goals. 
First, it would help combat voter suppression. Second, it would send 
the message to internet service providers that they are players with 
duties and responsibilities, and not just bystanders, in the democratic 
process. Given the current state of our democracy, both goals are 
worthy of serious pursuit. 
 
